The post-quantum transition has moved from theory to execution.
Not because a quantum computer arrives tomorrow, but because migration takes years and the clock on long-lived data is already running.
What is actually true today
Some widely deployed public-key cryptography is vulnerable to a sufficiently capable quantum computer. A cryptographically relevant quantum computer is not known to exist today. NIST has published post-quantum standards: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA). Federal policy now sets planning and transition milestones.
Quantum Iryx Systems builds Cassian, the operational control plane for cryptographic modernization. Cassian helps organizations understand where their cryptography lives, plan and govern post-quantum migration, and manage Isidore Quantum and other secure infrastructure over time.
Harvest now, decrypt later
Data captured today can be stored and decrypted later. For systems protecting data that must stay confidential for many years, the exposure exists now.
Why migration takes years
Large organizations need years to discover dependencies, replace products, update software, change PKI, test interoperability and govern the change. That is why the transition is a present-tense engineering and governance program, in the public and the private sector alike.
What commercial enterprises can learn from government
The interesting part of federal PQC policy is not the reporting requirement. It is the migration lifecycle: inventory, prioritize, plan, execute, validate, and prove. Commercial CISOs can adopt the same model before regulators or customers require it.
Start with your cryptographic landscape.
Tell us what you are protecting and where you are in the transition. We will point you to the right next step: a guide, an assessment, an architecture conversation, or a Cassian briefing.